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ABSTRACT
Remote e-voting protocols strive to achieve sophisticated
security properties. However, the inherent complexity of this
level of sophistication typically comes at a cost: Protocols
must either accept trade-offs in terms of security or are
impractical. In this paper, we show how the additional
communication capabilities given by the pervasive availability
of mobile phones today can be used to strengthen the security
offered by remote e-voting protocols. More precisely, the
presence of two separate channels between the voter and
the election authorities, namely the possibility for voters to
communicate with authorities using both their computers
and their mobile phones, opens up useful possibilities to
significantly improve the security of remote e-voting with
little cost in practicality.
We discuss three mobile building blocks that can be plugged
into many existing protocols from the literature, and that
yield important security properties such as eligibility, re-
sistance against impersonation attacks, inalterability, vote
independence and coercion resistance, and even privacy and
integrity of votes in the presence of malicious computers,
under realistic assumptions.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Protocols—Applications; E.3 [Data]: Data Encryption—
Public key cryptosystems
Keywords
remote electronic voting, mobile devices, secure platform
problem
1. INTRODUCTION
Protocols for remote e-voting have been studied for about
three decades. Nonetheless, the inherent complexity of such
systems and seemingly conflicting requirements with regards
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to their security have left researchers skeptical as to their re-
alizability in large-scaled, say nation-wide, elections. Indeed,
existing protocols either do not satisfactorily address the
problem of coercion and vote-buying [2, 3, 10], or they are
too impractical and involved to be understood by the vast
majority of users [5, 11]. In particular, a notable problem
is to achieve the property of individual verifiability (a voter
can verify that their vote was counted as intended) without
violating coercion resistance (a voter cannot prove to a co-
ercer how they voted). This problem has been addressed
in the past by using designated verifier proofs [13], or else
by enabling voters to forge fake credentials [5, 11]. These
avenues constitute impressive ideas from a cryptographic
point of view, yet from a user perspective they are simply
too complicated to be deployed in practice. Additionally, the
secure platform problem [9], that is, the problem of voting
using potentially corrupted computers, remains open. In
fact, despite being a realistic threat undoubtedly relevant
for governments that wish to implement e-voting [10, 14],
this problem is rarely addressed at all in remote e-voting
protocols. Instead, most protocols from the literature focus
on the voting system itself, and rely on the voter’s computer
operating strictly according to the voter’s wishes (often, a
voter and their computer are simply modeled as a single
entity). Yet, viruses and trojans are abundant nowadays,
and important security properties such as individual verifi-
ability or coercion resistance should clearly not rely on the
trustworthiness of voters’ computers.
With the pervasive presence and availability of mobile
devices today, we show that such problems can be addressed
much more efficiently. In particular, due to the presence
of two channels between the voter and the election authori-
ties, namely, the possibility for voters to communicate with
authorities both using their computers (via the Internet)
and using their mobile phones (via the mobile communica-
tions network) opens up practical possibilities to significantly
improve the security of such protocols.
In practice, it clearly is harder for any potential attacker
to eavesdrop on both the Internet and the mobile communi-
cations traffic of a voter than to listen on a single channel.
Yet, classical protocols only make use of one channel between
voter and authorities, typically the Internet. Online bank-
ing services have already recognized the improved security
given by communicating with their clients on two separate
channels: Nowadays, most such services make use of the
mobile communications network in order to send transaction
authentication numbers (TANs) for confirming financial on-
line transactions directly to their clients’ mobiles. While not
perfect [12], the security of this approach has proven to be
reasonably strong in practice.
In addition, the secure platform problem can be much
better addressed when both a computer and a mobile phone
have to be used for voting. Indeed, the presence of two
separate channels between the voter and the authorities
yields the possibility that neither device learns all traffic of
a particular voter: Clearly, it is a much less realistic attack
model that both of these devices owned by a particular voter
are malicious and collude, than an attack model where only
one of the two devices is malicious and does not operate
according to the voter’s actual wishes. That is, by requiring
both a computer and a phone we avoid the presence of a
single point of failure. Assuming that at least one of these
devices is honest, we can ensure privacy and integrity of
votes even when the other device is corrupted.
Contributions. While some governments have started using
mobile devices in their remote e-voting protocols [6, 10], the
security properties offered by such methods have never been
carefully analyzed. In this work, we study three mobile
building blocks that are modular enough to be easily plugged
into many existing remote e-voting protocols. We show that
they help to achieve several noteworthy security properties,
and outline the underlying assumptions.
The first of these building blocks are humanly computable
one-time pads. These are one-time pads sent to a voter’s
mobile phone that a voter uses to pre-encrypt their vote
before they enter it into a computer. Assuming that the
mobile device is honest and that an attacker cannot eavesdrop
on the mobile channel, the encryption of the vote yields
perfect secrecy, even when the voter’s computer is corrupted.
Second, we study the use of return codes sent to a voter’s
mobile phone and used to guarantee vote integrity. While
this idea has been proposed as an isolated mechanism in the
past [1, 10], we investigate how it combines with the humanly
computable one-time pads mentioned above. We study its
impact on security and how it interplays with the privacy
of a voter’s ballot, in particular towards the voting servers,
who must necessarily compute the return codes.
Finally, we investigate the possibility of having a voter
confirm their vote using a transaction authentication number
that is also sent to their mobile. Thereby, a voter’s mobile
effectively works as an additional credential, offering an
improved resistance against impersonation attacks that arise
when voting using a corrupted computer, or when credentials
sent to a voter before the election are otherwise leaked.
Using these building blocks, we obtain a high degree of
protection with regards to a corrupted platform. Additionally,
we remove much of the cryptography that makes protocols
error-prone and hard to understand from a user perspective.
2. PREREQUISITES
The techniques discussed in this paper are based on the
assumption that a voter who wishes to interact with the
voting servers has access to a computer and owns a personal
mobile phone, whose number is known to the authorities.
As depicted in Figure 1, we keep our interaction model as
general as possible, so that it may be instantiated with
potentially any remote e-voting protocol from the literature.
In order to capture the possibility of a potentially corrupted
platform, in our model a voter does not directly interact
with the voting servers herself; rather, she interacts with her
computer and mobile phone, and these devices interact with
the voting servers. We assume bidirectional links between
the voter, computer and server, but only unidirectional links
from server to phone and from phone to voter, to model the
fact that a phone is generally a poor input device. None of
our techniques requires any computation from the phone –
although we will see that security is greatly improved by,
say, the presence of a secure application that deletes the
information received from the server as soon as it has been
used. We denote a voter by V , their computer by CV , and
their mobile phone by MV . For simplicity and generality,
and since we focus on the client-side, we model the voting
servers as a single protocol participant, denoted by S.
V
CV
MV
S
Figure 1: Interaction between voter and authorities
We define n as the number of eligible candidates, and
Cand := {0, . . . , n− 1} as the set of candidate identification
numbers corresponding to the eligible candidates. The voting
system S owns a key pair (sk , pk), and the public key pk is
propagated to any computer used by a voter. Accordingly,
there are encryption and decryption algorithms E(·, ·) and
D(·, ·) to be used for the encryption of submitted votes.
3. MOBILE BUILDING BLOCKS
3.1 Humanly computable one-time pads
Our first building block is a form of pre-encryption of
ballots that yields strong privacy guarantees, even in the face
of corrupted devices or coercers.
The essential idea is the following. When a voter V wishes
to cast a ballot, the voting system S sends a canonical
mapping f from candidate names into the set Cand to the
voter’s computer CV , as well as a randomly selected one-
time pad i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} to the voter’s mobile phone MV .
The voter’s computer thus presents the voter with candidate
names and the associated candidate identification numbers.
The voter is then asked to add the one-time pad i to the
candidate identification number of their preferred candidate
(modulo n), and send the resulting number back to the voting
system through their computer. Alternatively, S can pre-
compute f(v) + i mod n for all v, and send a corresponding
table to MV . Then V needs not perform any computation,
but the message gets clumsier. This interaction is depicted
in Figure 2, where v represents the voter’s chosen candidate.
The underlying intention of this approach is that an at-
tacker or a corrupted device needs to learn messages from
both channels in order to break vote privacy. This particular
pre-encryption presents several advantages: (i) it is easily
computable by a human; (ii) it is as strong as a one-time-pad;
and (iii) it is easy for a voter to lie to a coercer about the
value i, such that, assuming that a coercer cannot eavesdrop
on the mobile channel, a voting scheme implementing this ap-
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c︷ ︸︸ ︷
f(v) + i mod n
c′︷ ︸︸ ︷
E(pk , c)
Figure 2: Ballot submission with one-time pads
proach obtains a form of coercion resistance. More precisely,
this mechanism yields the following privacy-type guarantees.
Vote privacy. Even in the case where a voting computer
is corrupted, it will not learn how a voter voted. Indeed,
while the computer knows the mapping f from candidates to
identification numbers and the value c cast by the voter, it
does not learn the value i that was sent to the voter’s mobile.
This value effectively works as a one-time pad, and hence
each vote is equally probable from the computer’s perspective.
This is true assuming that the mobile device is honest and
does not collude with the computer, and that the computer
is not able to otherwise eavesdrop on the channel between
S and MV . Conversely, if the computer is honest but the
mobile is not, then the mobile does not learn the voter’s vote,
assuming that it cannot eavesdrop on the channel between
S and CV , since it simply does not learn the value c.
Coercion resistance. This property states that even
when a voter interacts with a coercer during the voting pro-
cess, the coercer cannot ensure that the voter followed his
instructions [11]. To achieve coercion resistance, it is nec-
essary that the voter can, at some point during the voting
process, communicate with election authorities via an untap-
pable channel. For instance, JCJ [11] assumes an untappable
channel during the registration phase between the voter and
a trusted registrar, while the scheme proposed by Lee [13]
assumes an untappable channel between the voter and an
external, tamper-resistant device owned by the voter (both
schemes have been shown to be coercion resistant [4, 7]). In
our case, we assume that the communication on one of the
two channels between voter and authorities remains secret to
the adversary. Let us first assume that the mobile is honest
and that a coercer cannot eavesdrop on the mobile channel.
Then, a voter could easily fool a coercer by pretending that
the value i was the one that would have resulted in the vote
demanded by the coercer. As a result, a coercer cannot be
sure whether the voter is telling the truth. We note that
additional mechanisms should be implemented to ensure that
the message sent to the mobile is securely deleted after the
voter has seen its content (such as a specialized app required
for receiving or decrypting the message), so that the voter
cannot be forced into revealing the value i. Similarly as
for vote privacy, if we conversely assume that the mobile
is corrupted, but the computer is honest and the coercer
cannot eavesdrop on the channel between S and CV , then
coercion resistance easily follows since a coercer never learns
the voter’s encrypted ballot, so the voter can lie about the
ciphertext they sent.
Vote independence. This notion means, among other
things, that a vote cast by a voter cannot be copied by
someone observing the messages sent and received by that
voter [8]. In our scenario, assuming that an observer cannot
eavesdrop on a voter’s mobile channel, then he cannot copy
that voter’s vote. Indeed, if the observer simply cast the
very same ciphertext as the other voter, then, as the observer
would himself obtain an independent, random one-time pad i,
he would cast a vote for any candidate with equal probability.
In the case where the phone is corrupted, but the computer
is honest and the channel between system and computer is
untappable, the argument for vote independence is analogous
to the one for vote privacy and coercion resistance.
As we see, this building block yields strong privacy guar-
antees against eavesdroppers on one of the channels. Yet, it
clearly does nothing about the vote’s integrity. For instance,
it would be easy for a corrupted computer to perform ran-
domization attacks. In order to ensure vote integrity, we
investigate another mobile mechanism: return codes.
3.2 Return codes
Return codes are human-readable, personalized and un-
forgeable codes sent to a voter via an out-of-band channel –
such as a voter’s mobile phone – that allow a voter to verify
that their vote was correctly recorded by the system. The
idea is not novel; it has been proposed as early as [1], and
is indeed used in systems that are deployed in practice [10].
Here we mean to analyze the impact of return codes on se-
curity properties, and its interaction with the one-time pads
discussed above.
We stress that return codes must be personalized and
secret: Otherwise, it may be possible for an attacker who
managed to alter a voter’s electronic ballot to send back the
return code corresponding to the original vote, making the
voter believe that their vote was cast as intended. Further-
more, such a personalized table must be sent to the voter
prior to the election, for instance along with their ballot
paper or their credentials. Sending this table to either the
voter’s computer or their mobile during the voting process
is not possible: Such an approach would be vulnerable to
randomization attacks where a malicious device shuﬄes the
association between candidates and return codes – in such
a case, a vote could be maliciously altered on the way to
the voting servers, and the associated return code sent from
the servers would match the displayed return code of the
intended candidate with non-negligible probability.
We therefore assume that a table of return codes was
sent to each voter before the election, say, by mail. The
main remaining problem is that on the one hand, the voting
servers have to generate a return code that corresponds
to a candidate, while on the other hand we would like to
avoid that any of the voting servers learns how the voter
voted before the tallying phase. Therefore, a reasonable
approach seems to be to use an encryption scheme with
homomorphic properties in order to compute return codes
inside an encrypted vote. As we want to avoid having to
trust the devices on the client side, we adopt a similar idea
as that proposed in [10]: First, for ballot encryption we use
the additive homomorphic encryption scheme ElGamal in
some cyclic group G with generator g. The secret key sk is
an element x ∈ {0, . . . , |G| − 1}, and the public key pk is the
value gx ∈ G. For each voter V , let sV ∈ {0, . . . , |G| − 1} be
a secret exponent generated uniformly at random, and dV (·)
be a pseudo-random function that maps elements of G to a
human-readable form (such as a string of 6 or so characters).
Furthermore, assume that the voting system S is composed
of at least two servers S1 and S2. Neither server knows the
decryption key x, but they each know a piece x1 or x2 such
that x ≡ x1 + x2 mod |G|. Additionally, S1 knows the one-
time pads sent to voters after submission of a ballot and the
personalized secret exponents sV , while S2 knows all pseudo-
random functions dV . As in Section 3.1, assume that a pre-
encrypted ballot has the form c ≡ f(v) + i mod n. Then,
the voter’s computer CV encrypts the ballot c by computing
E(pk , c) = (gr, gxrgc) (where r is randomness), and sends
this to S1. Note that since i ∈ {0, . . . , n−1}, f(v)+i mod n
is either f(v) + i, or it is f(v) + i− n. Hence, S1 and S2 will
jointly compute two return codes, one for each case. First, S1
computes both w1 = g
xrgcg−i and w2 = gxrgcg−i+n. Thus,
either w1 or w2 equals w := g
xrgf(v), i.e., the encryption of
the vote stripped of the one-time pad. Next, S1 computes
(xˆ, wˆ) := ((gr)sV , (wg−x1)sV ) = (grsV , gx2rsV gf(v)sV ), i.e.,
S1 homomorphically adds in the secret exponent sV , but
strips out the exponent x1. Note that S1 does not know
whether w = w1 or w = w2, however it can perform the
above computation twice, once using w1 and once using
w2, resulting in two pairs (xˆ, wˆ1) and (xˆ, wˆ2) respectively.
Accordingly, either wˆ = wˆ1 or wˆ = wˆ2. Now, S1 sends
(xˆ, wˆ1) and (xˆ, wˆ2) to S2, which computes ρ1 := wˆ1xˆ
−x2 and
ρ2 := wˆ2xˆ
−x2 . Thus, either ρ1 or ρ2 equals ρ := gf(v)sV .
Finally, S2 sends the values dV (ρ1) and dV (ρ2) back to
the voter’s mobile MV , who checks both codes against the
personalized table sent to them prior to the election: This
table maps all candidates v to the value dV (g
f(v)sV ). If
one of the codes matches, the voter can be sure that their
vote arrived at the election authorities unchanged. Note
that the other return code will either be dV (g
(f(v)−n)sV ) or
dV (g
(f(v)+n)sV ) and therefore encrypt a vote out of range,
i.e., it will simply be an invalid return code that does not
correspond to a candidate.
Inalterability. This property essentially states that a
ballot cannot be changed when sent to the voting system,
i.e., it is a form of vote integrity. Return codes provide us with
exactly the means we need in order to guarantee inalterability.
If a network attacker were to exchange the ciphertext sent by
a voter to the voting system S in transit, or a malicious voting
computer encrypted a vote other than the one intended by
the voter, both return codes computed by the servers S1
and S2 would be different from the one associated with the
desired candidate on the voter’s table. Then, a voter could
either (a) complain to the authorities, or (b) not confirm their
vote, as required by the protocol in consideration. Again, we
emphasize that a message containing sensitive information
such as return codes should be securely deleted after the
voter has seen it, so as to ensure that the voter cannot reveal
their ballot to a third party. In the case where the mobile
is corrupted, it could display fake return codes to the voter.
However, without the knowledge of the table, it would be
unable to predict valid return codes, i.e., the fake return
codes would be identified as such with high probability, and
therefore strongly indicate that one of the voting devices is
corrupted. In such a case, a voter might consider trying to
fix their mobile, or using another mobile (with their original
SIM card), and start over the vote casting process, in order
to ensure that their vote is cast as intended.
Coercion resistance (continued). It is worth consid-
ering how return codes affect coercion resistance, as they,
along with the table of return codes, can be used as a receipt
to prove how a voter voted, in particular in the case where
a mobile is corrupted and thus the return codes are not
securely deleted after having been displayed to the voter, or
are even sent directly to a coercer. If a coercer additionally
gets hold of the original table of a voter, coercion resistance
is clearly broken. However, without knowledge of the table
the coercer would not obtain any information about how
the voter voted. Furthermore, if asked for this table by the
coercer, it would be easy for a voter to forge a table of return
codes that would satisfy the coercer, e.g., by swapping the
return code of their intended vote with the return code of
the vote demanded by the coercer.
Concluding this section, return codes ensure a certain
degree of vote integrity, as a network attacker or a malicious
voting device cannot forge them. We recommend that a voter
should confirm to the voting system that the return code was
correct before the vote is actually counted. For this purpose,
we suggest to use TANs.
3.3 Transaction authentication numbers
Transaction authentication numbers (TANs) have been
used for quite some time by online banking services in order
to increase the security of financial online transactions. Es-
sentially, a TAN is a one-time password that the user must
enter in addition to their usual credentials to authorize a
specific transaction. Thus, they form a kind of two-factor
authentication, intended to improve security over a simple
one-factor authentication (such as for instance a password
or a digital signature). Different methods for TAN distri-
bution and generation are used in practice: TANs may be
pre-distributed on indexed lists, sent to the voter’s mobile,
or generated by both sides separately using some secret infor-
mation. In the spirit of exploring security properties arising
from using mobile devices, we focus on the method where a
TAN is sent to a voter’s mobile phone.
The mechanism is straightforward. Upon reception of a
vote from a computer CV and verification of the voter’s
credentials (such as a digital signature), the voting system S
generates a reasonably large random number (say, 6 or 8
digits). The received ballot is stored in a database along with
the TAN and marked as not fully authorized. The TAN is
then sent to the voter’s mobile MV (ideally along with return
codes as discussed in Section 3.2). The voter enters this TAN
into their computer and sends it back to S to confirm their
ballot. The voting system now checks that the TAN matches
the one stored in the database, and marks the associated
ballot as authorized, to be counted in the tallying phase.
This mechanism improves the verification of a voter’s eli-
gibility in a voting protocol with respect to corrupted com-
puters or stolen credentials. In particular, it improves the
following security properties of e-voting protocols.
Eligibility. Requiring a TAN to confirm a vote in effect
promotes a voter’s mobile to an additional credential. This
may even remove the need for a PKI established before the
election (such as the need for each voter to have a registered
signing key). Setting up such a PKI is difficult and costly, yet
most protocols from the literature simply assume that one
is in place. While this may be an acceptable assumption in
high-stakes elections, a PKI is less realistic for small elections,
say in small online communities. In a system without PKI, a
voter would not be required to sign a ballot sent to S. Then,
although an attacker might submit a ballot for another voter
to the system, the attacker would not be able to confirm it
without the correct TAN. This is assuming that an attacker
cannot listen on mobile channels. In practice, mobiles should
only serve as an additional, but not as the only credential.
This is particularly important if we assume that the mobile
is corrupted (but the computer is honest). Then, such a
corrupted mobile could not vote on the voter’s behalf, as it
would lack some secret information, such as a signing key
known only to the computer. Note however that in the case
where a mobile is corrupted, it may still perform a denial-
of-service attack by not displaying the TAN, or displaying
an incorrect one. Similarly as for the case where a mobile
displays fake return codes, here a voter would have to either
fix their mobile, or use another mobile with their original
SIM card. Another possibility would be to allow voters to
vote both electronically and with traditional paper ballots,
where the traditional way takes precedence over electronically
cast ballots – as is done in Norway [10]. Then, if a malicious
phone prevents a voter from casting their ballot, that voter
could still revert to paper ballots, as a backup solution.
Resistance against impersonation attacks. This no-
tion deals with the problem that credentials, such as pass-
words or even signing keys, may be leaked to an attacker
unbeknownst to the voter. For instance, they may get stolen
when sent to the voter, or a corrupted computer may simply
store them and vote on the voter’s behalf. With mobile
TANs, credentials are not limited only to something that a
voter knows, but additionally to something that a voter has,
in this case their mobile. For instance, in the Norwegian or
Estonian protocols, a voter may re-cast an electronic vote,
overriding a possible previous electronic vote [6, 10]. A ma-
licious computer CV in possession of a voter’s credentials
may thus re-cast a ballot after the voter V has already cast
their ballot. Similarly, CV may alter the voter’s intended
ballot in the first place. Although return codes provide some
protection here, they require the voter to take further action
in such situations, such as re-voting on another device or
complaining to the authorities. Using TANs as an additional
line of defense would remove that burden from voters and
prevent corrupted computers or attackers who stole a voter’s
credentials from voting on the voter’s behalf. Clearly, if
an attacker stole a voter’s credentials and corrupted that
voter’s mobile, he could break even this defense, but such an
attack would clearly be quite involved and unlikely to pass
unnoticed when performed on a large scale.
4. CONCLUSION
We have proposed three practical mechanisms that help to
improve the security of remote e-voting protocols by exploit-
ing the possibility to communicate with voters on distinct
channels, thanks to today’s widespread availability of mobile
phones. These mechanisms, despite their simplicity, can pro-
vide strong security guarantees even when one of the voter’s
devices is corrupted, a problem that has been mostly ignored
in previous protocols. Combining these techniques with ex-
isting voting systems, we may finally be close to obtaining
truly practical, secure remote e-voting systems.
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